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Ailes: Oil and Gas--Damages for Wrongful Geophysical Exploration
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Unquestionably, the decision in the principal case reaches the
desirable result. No good reason is advanced for giving a defendant at law an advantage not afforded a plaintiff. But in the light
of the state of the common law authority, it is believed that the
decision would have been strengthened by at least an analogy to
if not an application of the existing statut.e
-Guy

0IL AND GAS -

OTTO FARMER.

DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL GEOPHYSICAL Ex-

Plaintiff owned some twenty-six thousand acres of
salt marsh in an oil bearing region. Defendant's agents entered
by mistake and made certain geophysical tests, thereby revealing
the presence of oil. Plaintiff brought this action, setting up the
value of a "selection lease"' as the correct measure of damages.
Defendant argued that the amount of money normally paid for
a "shooting permit ' 2 was the proper criterion by which to ascertain that sum. Held, plaintiff may recover the reasonable value
of the privilege used. Evidence of the value of a selection lease
should be admissable on a retrial of the case, but the attention of
the jury should be called to the fact that the defendant did not
get an important incident of a selection lease, namely, the option.
Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Scully.
Previously, when recovery has been sought for defendant's
trespass and discovery of information as to the presence of oil,
the problem has been attacked from the tort aspect, with the extent of plaintiff's loss constituting the measure of damages.4 The
PLORATION. -

rett, 265 Fed. 557 (C. C. A. 1st, 1920); Whitney v. Johnson, 14 F. (2d) 24
(C. C. A. 9th, 1926). Contra: Keatley v. U. S. Trust Co., supra n. 4; Pringle
v. Storrow, supra n. 4.
1 A selection lease conveys to the lessee full exploratory privileges plus
the option to take up what acres the lessee desires at a previously agreed
upon price. The down payment made by the lessee is normally between $0.25
and $4.00 per acre. Appellant's brief, p. 9, citing record.
2 A shooting permit conveys exploratory privileges alone.
The value
normally is from $15.00 to $50.00 a shot point, depending on whether or not
the Oil Co. will have to refill the holes. The amount of land involved is immaterial. Some permits require additional payments of as much as $5.00 per
100 pounds of dynamite used. Appellant's brief, pp. 9 and 10, citing record.
3 71 F. (2d) 772 (C. A. A. 5th, 1934).
4 Humble Oil Co. v. Kishi, 261 S. W. 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), 276 S.
W. 190 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925), 291 S. W. 538 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927);
Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 253 Pac. 862, 52 A. L. R. 91 (1927);
Thomas v. Texas Co., 12 S. W. (2d) 597; note (1928) 4 Tnx L. REv. 215.
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prospective lease value constituted the loss in those cases, the information obtained having been unfavorable. In the principal
case, the information obtained was favorable, the lease value of
the premises was not destroyed, and the plaintiff seeks to recover
the value of the benefit taken by the defendant. Thus the basis
of recovery would seem to be in quasi contract and so the court
considered it.5
Can there be a recovery in quasi contract for a trespasser's
use of land which does not exclude the owner from possession?
The benefit in this case was taken by the defendant rather than
having been conferred by the plaintiff.0 In a case of this nature,
it must be shown that the benefit received by the defendant has
actually been taken from the plaintiff,7 a "minus quantity"5 on
the part of the plaintiff being necessary as well as a "plus quantity" on the part of the defendant. The minus quantity in a case
of this nature is found in the fact that the plaintiff has been temporarily deprived of the exclusive use of his land to which he is
entitled.9 As for the plus quantity on the part of the defendant,
it seems clear that he has received a benefit. Not only has he received information as to lands other than the plaintiff's, but he
has exercised a privilege for which payment is usually made.
Though it has been argued that the benefit must consist in an
actual increase in the estate of the defendant, 10 it would seem that
so long as the defendant receives something desired by him, actual
enrichment is unnecessary.".
As to the measure of recovery, it is fundamental that the value
of the benefit enjoyed by the defendant forms the correct test. 2
In the principal case, the defendant conducted explorations on
51".

. . the simple theory of plaintiff's case (that by an act at least

quasi an offense, giving rise to an obligation in quasi contracts, defendant
had taken a privilege for which he ought to pay ....

)".

71 F. (2d) 772,

775.
OThis subtitle in the law of quasi contracts has been variously termed by
the writers. It has been called "Waiver of Tort" in KEENER, QUASI COXTRACTS (1893) 159, and THURSTON, CASES ON QUASI CONTRACTS (1916) 573;

and "Action for Restitution as Alternative Remedy for Tort" in WOODWARD, THE LAW or QuAsi CONURACTS (1913) 437.
7WOODWARD, op. cit. supra n. 6, § 274.
s WOODWAR, op. cit. supra n. 6, § 274. KEENER, op. cit. supra n. 6 at 163.
OWOODWARD, op. cit. supra n. 6, § 275, KEENER, op. cit. supra n. 6 at 165.
Contra: Phillips v. Homfray, 24 Ch. D. 439 (1883).
10 Phillips v. Homfray, supra n. 9; Payne's Appeal, 65 Conn. 397, 32 Atl.
948 (1895). These cases involve actions against executors, and this factor
appears to be the basis of the holding that an actual enrichment of the estate
is necessary.
l1 WoODWARD, op. cit. supra n. 6, § 8. KEENER, op. cit. supra n. 6, at 164.
.2 WODWA D, op. cit. supra n. 6, § 292.
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the plaintiff's land and garnered information as to the location of
oil in the general neighborhood. Under a shooting permit, he
would have been privileged to do exactly that. He did not receive
the option that forms a vital part of the consideration in a selection lease. Evidence of the value of a selection lease has no bearing on the measurement of the value of the privilege to make tests
on the plaintiff's land unless the option may be separately evaluated, and no attempt was made to do this. It would seem, therefore, that the evidence was irrelevant. The court thought it admissable because of a certain Code provision 13 allowing the jury
great discretion in the assessment of damages in a case in quasi
contracts. 4 Since the damages are to be measured by the value
actuallytaken, it would seem that the jury, regardless of its discretion, should be limited in its consideration to that value, and
evidence, otherwise irrelevant, should not be rendered relevant
by this provision.
-STEPH

AMES.

PARENT AND C LD - EFFECT OF PAYMENT BY BANx OF
CHILD's DEPOSIT TO PARENT NOT A LEGAL GuARDIAN. - Defendant
bank had paid out a deposit belonging to infants, to their father,
without their consent. The father had not qualified as their legal
guardian. Plaintiff brought an action on behalf of the infants to
recover the amount of the deposit. There was a finding of fact
that the fund represented not earnings of the children but gifts
to them by their parents. The circuit court gave judgment for
the defendant and the plaintiff brought error. Held, the bank
had paid the funds to one not the legal guardian of the infants and
was liable to them for the amount of the deposit. Reversed and
remanded. Fleshmn v. Bank of Harlinton.1
This decision is perfectly sound but the circumstances of the
case present a situation subject to misinterpretation on the part of
the business community.
At common law the father is the natural guardian of his infant children 2 and, in the absence of good and sufficient cause,3 is
13 LA. Rsv. CIV. CODE (Merriek's 3d ed. 1925) art. 1934.

'4 71 F. (2d) 772, 774.
1173 S. E. 775 (W. Va. 1934).
2 Rust v. Vanvacter, 9 W. Va. 600 (1876); Green v. Campbell, 35 W. Va.
698, 14 S. E. 212 (1891).
8 State v. Rueff, 29 W. Va. 751, 2 S. E. 801 (1886).
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